|
EXPORT AND
IMPORT CONTROL OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FROM AND INTO THE SACU
The Customs
Tariff has been harmonized throughout SACU, and the SACU Countries use the
Jacobsens Harmonized Customs Tariff (published by LexisNexis). The official
version of the SACU CET is maintained by the South African revenue Service (SARS),
on behalf of the SACU Member States. Import duties and taxes, with certain
exceptions, are identical in all the SACU Countries.
Import and
Export control, certain clearance procedures and Value-Added Tax have not
been Harmonized throughout SACU.
South
Africa’s import and export control regimes are far more complex than that of
the BLNS Countries, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland.
The Import
and Export Control Divisions of the International Trade Administration
Commission of South Africa (ITAC) are responsible for import licensing,
which is aligned to the WCO’s Import Licensing Agreement and export control
from South Africa.
South
Africa is also part of many other international treaties and regimes, and in
terms of her commitments under those agreements, base their import and
export controls on these instruments.
Many
reasons for South Africa’s import and export control measures are listed on
the ITAC website:
www.itac.org.za.
There are
more reasons, which are listed on the website of other controlling
authorities, for example the export and import control of nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons (so-called "Weapons of Mass Destruction" (WMD))
and their delivery systems.
Globally,
control over WMD is pursued through international agreements and
arrangements (Treaties, Conventions and Control Regimes) relating to
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their specific means of delivery
and the associated dual-use ramifications.
South
Africa is a signatory to most of these (international) treaties, conventions
and control regimes. The Big Four multilateral export control regimes are:
The
focus of most of these reforms are export control, rather than import
control. South Africa’s focus is on import control. This can become
problematic, particularly when dual-use goods are exported to developed
economies such as the United States and the European Union.
Secondly,
the South African non-proliferation legislation is complex, and it should be
consolidated. At present there are various notices on the website of the
South African Council for the Non-Proliferation (NPC) of Weapons of Mass
Destruction relating to the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Act, 1993 (Act No. 87 of 1993), as amended, supported by the new regulations
and notices as published on 03 February 2010, such as notices relating to
registration, missiles, nuclear, chemicals, biological and "catch-all". The
most substantial amendments were published under Notice Numbers 16 to 22 of
03 February 2010. The latest updates were published on 18 February 2015. The
Non-Proliferation Council are busy reviewing the legislation, but the
updates are not anticipated to be ready prior to the end of 2018.
The focus
of South Africa’s non-proliferation legislation is too much on national
security, and the international commitments, in terms of which the focus
should be on import control, is neglected. Hence the focus on import
control, rather than export control.
In
reforming the legislation not only will South Africa’s national security be
enhanced and strengthened, but also security in the rest of the region. In
addition, SACU’s ability to counter threats such as the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
According
to the website of the Australia Group, The Australia Group (AG) is an
informal forum of countries which, through the harmonisation of export
controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development
of chemical or biological weapons. Co-ordination of national export control
measures assists Australia Group participants to fulfil their obligations
under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention to the fullest extent possible.
The
classification and identification of "dual-use goods and technology" are
important measures to identify "strategic goods" which have inherent
capabilities that could allow their diversion into products which can be
used in a military or WMD environment without modification. The inherent
capabilities of many products which seem to be innocent products can be used
for the same purpose. Dual-use products and technologies are generally
products which can be used in both civilian and military platforms without
modifications. However, that alone is an over-simplification of the
definition of dual-use goods and technologies. Basically dual-use products
are products with high level technological capabilities which are laid down
in dual-use lists, of which the WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON EXPORT CONTROLS FOR
CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES is arguably the most
important regime.
If a
product is deemed to come under export or import control as a "dual-use
product" it means controls are in place to ensure that the product is
controlled by the participants of the Wassenaar Arrangement or similar
groups (such as the Australia Group) through approval by competent authority
(such as the South African Non-Proliferation Council).
In the
United States of America, dual-use legislation are regulated by the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR).
Each
country sets its own dual-use controls based on the Wassenaar Arrangement or
similar regimes.
In the
United States of America, commercial items are subject to dual-use controls
which are published on the Commercial Control List (CCL). The dual-use items
that are subject to export control needs to be classified and identified,
and this is done through entries which are called Export Control
Classification Numbers (ECCN's). According to the website of the Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS) of the US Department of Commerce (DOC),
https://www.bis.doc.gov/, ECCNs are five character alpha-numeric
designations used on the Commerce Control List (CCL) to identify dual-use
items for export control purposes. An ECCN categorizes items based on the
nature of the product, i.e. type of commodity, software, or technology and
its respective technical parameters. ECCNs and similar systems in other
countries, for example DUECs in the European Union, are a modification of
the numbering of dual-use goods that appear in the WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT ON
EXPORT CONTROLS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES .
ECCNs, DUEC
and similar nomenclatures reveal the following about the dual-use controls:
An example
of an ECCN is 3-A-0-01
The first
group indicates any number from "0" to "9". It indicates the category, for
example:
-
0 =
nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and miscellaneous;
-
1 =
materials, chemicals, micro-organisms and toxins;
-
2 =
materials processing;
-
3 =
electronics;
-
4 =
computers;
-
5 =
Part 1 (telecommunications) and Part 2 information security
-
6 =
sensors and lasers
-
7 =
navigation and avionics
-
8 =
marine; and
-
9 =
aerospace and propulsion
The second
group (letters "A" to "E") indicates any one of the following product groups
of the export (and sometimes also import control lists):
-
A = End
items, equipment, accessories, attachments, parts, components and
systems
-
B =
Test, inspection and production equipment
-
C =
Materials
-
D =
Software
-
E =
Technology
The third
digit differs from country to country. It either indicates the reason for
the control, or the regime in question. In the case of the USA the serious
numbers are the following:
-
0 =
National security;
-
1 =
Missile technology;
-
2 =
Nuclear non-proliferation;
-
3 =
chemical and biological;
-
5 =
National security or foreign policy;
-
6 =
Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List (WAML) or former US Munitions List
(USML); and
-
9 =
Anti-terrorism, crime control, regional stability, short supply, Un
Sanctions, etc.
Source:
https://www.customs.gov.sg/businesses/strategic-goods-control/strategic-goods-control-list/list-of-dual-use-goods
Sometimes
there are slight variations between the nomenclatures countries use for the
control of strategic goods. The illustration above has been copied from the
website of the Singapore Customs Authority. If you study it in detail, you
will notice that it differs slightly from the explanation above the picture.
With
knowledge of the Wassenaar Arrangement and other dual-use controls,
nomenclatures such as ECCN and/or DUEC can link products that are subject to
dual-use control.
South
Africa is the only SACU country that utilises such a nomenclature.
According
to the website of the Australia Group none of the SACU Countries are
Australia Group Participants but according to the website of the
Non-Proliferation Council of South Africa (NSG), South Africa is a
participant.
South
Africa is the only SACU Country that is a Member (Partner) of the Missile
Technology Control regime (MTCR) as well as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
and Wassenaar Arrangement (WA).
In the
interest of regional security and non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, SACU should at least improve and harmonize its legislation on
strategic goods. |
